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applies mechanistic rules. The problem now is to develop the new
standard so that it is not only just but that it is also efficient.
LESLIE WAYNE BURKE

EDITOR'S NOTE: In a four-three decision on rehearing, the court has since
reversed its holding, but indicated that lex loci delicti, although of primary importance, is not the only consideration upon which choice of law will be determined. No. 35,203, July 26, 1967.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY
WHO INVOKED SELF-INCRIMINATION PRIVILEGE
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Spevack v. Klein, 87 Sup. Ct. 625 (1967)
In a proceeding to discipline a New York attorney for professional
misconduct, the attorney-petitioner refused to honor a subpoena
duces tecum served on him to produce financial records. The petitioner's sole defense at this proceeding was that his testimony and production of records would tend to incriminate him. The New York
Court of Appeals affirmed petitioner's disbarment, holding that the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination was not available.'
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court HELD, refusal of
petitioner to produce records or testify on the basis that his testimony
would tend to incriminate him was an unconstitutional ground for
disbarment. Judgment reversed, Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and
White dissenting, Mr. Justice Fortas concurring separately.
In ordering petitioner disbarred, the appellate division's decision
was based on Cohen v. Hurley,2 where an attorney was also disbarred
for refusing to testify. The Cohen decision held that the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment was not applicable to
the states through the fourteenth amendment. Three years after
Cohen, the Supreme Court in Malloy v. Hogan3 held that the selfincrimination clause of the fifth amendment was applicable to the
states. Adhering to that decision, the Supreme Court in the instant
case overruled Cohen thus extending protection against self-incrimination to attorneys.
Mr. Justice Harlan in dissenting argued that the disbarment was
constitutionally permissible. Relying heavily on Orloff v. Willoughby, 4 the dissent asserts that the petitioner can invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination, but that in so doing he may be denied the
privilege of practicing law. In Orloff, the Court affirmed the denial
1. Klein v.
2. 366 U.S.
3. 378 U.S.
4. 345 U.S.

Spevack, 16 N.Y.2d 1048, 213 N.E.2d 457, 266 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1965).
117 (1961).
1 (1964).
83 (1953).
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of an officer's commission to a serviceman who refused to answer
loyalty questions. The salient difference between a serviceman denied a commission and an attorney denied his professional standing
undermines the efficacy of this analogy. The "fulcrum" of the selfincrimination cases, according to the dissent, is Slochower v. Board
of Higher Eduation.5 The Supreme Court, in reversing a professor's
dismissal for refusal to answer questions, found that the questions
presented were unrelated to college functions and therefore irrelevant.
In Nelson v. County of Los Angeles,6 on the other hand, a county
employee's dismissal was affirmed because the questions asked were
relevant to his employment. Accordingly, the dissent argues that a
state "may in the course of a bona fide assessment of an employee's
fitness for public employment require that the employee disclose
information reasonably related to his fitness, and may order his discharge if he declines."'
Courts have traditionally exercised summary jurisdiction over
members of the bar,8 and may validly require of lawyers minimum
standards of ethical conduct as long as such standards have a rational
connection with professional fitness.9 Though courts have this broad
authority, a person cannot be excluded from the practice of law in
a manner that contravenes the due process or equal protection
clauses.1o In disciplinary proceedings, the attorney is entitled to notice
of the grounds of the complaint and an ample opportunity to be
heard.11 He must be allowed the opportunity to confront his accusers,
cross-examine them, and refute their accusations. 1 2
Until the Spevack case, the privilege against self-incrimination as
applied to attorneys in licensing and disciplinary proceedings, was
but a watered-down procedural guarantee. It was diluted through utilization of a balancing test; in essence, the attorney's right to withhold
information was balanced against the public's concern with maintaining high ethical standards among those who occupy a position of
public trust.'13 This depreciation of fifth amendment protection was
reiterated in Konigsberg v. State Bar. 4 Affirming the appellant's denial of admission to the bar, the Court held that an attorney could
5.

350 US. 551 (1956).

6. 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
7. 87 Sup. Ct. 625, 635 (1967).
8. Ex parteWall, 107 U.S. 265, 274 (1882).
9. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
10. Id. at 238.
11. Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354 (1871).
12. Willner v. Committee on Character, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
13. In re Anastoplo, 366 U.S. 82, 95 (1961); Cohen v. Hurley, 366 U.S. 117,
123 (1961); accord, Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 32 (1948).
14. 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
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not refuse to answer questions if such questions had a "substantial
relevance to his qualifications."3 This encroachment on an attorney's
fifth amendment rights has been explained in terms of subtle coercion:
the attorney holds the key to his admission and practice in his own
hands.16
The dissenting Justices seemingly interpret the instant holding
as an abrogation of the government's right to dismiss an employee
who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. Failing to acknowledge a meaningful difference between public employees and
attorneys, the dissent demands a uniform application of constitutional
standards to both attorneys and public employees. By ignoring the
dissenting opinion's demand, the majority holds that attorneys, as
distinguished from public employees, are in a "semi-public" position. 17
This dichotomy is manifested by the existence of two constitutional
standards. A governmental employee may be dismissed for refusing
to answer questions that are relevant to his employment,18 whereas
an attorney, under the instant holding, cannot be dismissed under
similar circumstances.19
This self-incrimination double standard is justified. In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Fortas approvingly contrasted the difference
"between a lawyer's right to remain silent and that of a public employee who is asked questions specifically, directly, and narrowly relating to the performance of his official duties."2 0 An employee of
the government is not necessarily restricted to governmental work and
may thus perform similarly rewarding tasks in areas of private employment. An attorney, on the other hand, exerts valuable time and
expense in preparing for his profession. As a licensee of the state,
he must satisfactorily comply with its established criteria for admission and practice. To jeopardize an attorney's standing at the bar
by diminishing his fifth amendment rights is an unreasonable abuse
of the power delegated to the licensor or disciplinary body. Referring
to this exigency, Mr. Justice Black, dissenting in In re Anastoplo1
stated: "To force the Bar to become a group of thoroughly orthodox,
time-serving, government-fearing individuals is to humiliate and degrate it."22
15.

Id. at 44.

16. In re Anastoplo, 366 U.S. 82, 97 (1961).
17. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 578 (1945).
18. Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960).
19. The court specifically deferred any consideration of the problem that
would arise if an attorney were disbarred for refusal to produce records he was
lawfully and properly required to keep by state law. 87 Sup. Ct. 625, 629 (1967).
See Mr. Justice Fortas, concurring at 630.
20. Id. at 630.

21.

366 U.S. 82,97 (1961).

22. Id. at 115-16.
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